Chinese Local Governments’ Behavioral Logic of Early-Warning Information Release Regarding Major Epidemic Outbreaks from the Organizational Analysis Perspective

Xinling Dai, Xiaobing Peng, Jinglei Wang


Based on the three-dimensional ‘organizational goal – organizational field – organizational incen­tive’ analysis framework, this paper attempts to conduct a comparative and diachronic analysis of the behavioral logic of Chinese local governments’ early-warning information release in major epidemic outbreaks. The results of the research show that the organizational goal, field and incentive are highly rel­evant to different strategic choices of whether local governments should, will and are willing to perform their governance function; additionally, different combinations of these elements trigger different lo­cal government behaviors. The organizational goal, field and incentive are the starting point, turning point, and end point of local governments’ behavior­al logic, respectively, while the organizational field is prerequisite for the organizational incentive to work. The organizational goal – organizational field – organizational incentive sequence reflects the se­quence and interactive relationship of local govern­ments’ behavioral logic.


organizational analysis; Chinese local government; major epidemic outbreaks; early-warning information release.

Full Text:


DOI: Creative Commons License
Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences by TRAS is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Based on a work at

Online ISSN: 2247-8310 | Print ISSN: 1842-2845 |  © AMP

The opinions expressed in the texts published are the author’s own and do not necessarily express the views of TRAS editors. The authors assume all responsibility for the ideas expressed in the materials published.