The article that follows examines the role of mayoral leadership in two large cities in Ukraine - Kyiv and Odessa. It begins with an examination of the various roles and resources typically found in the office of mayor, as well as a review of some of the unique characteristics of local governance in Ukraine. It then examines the activities of recent mayors in the two cities. It concludes by suggesting a somewhat expanded set of mayoral roles based on the Ukrainian experience.


The past two decades have been a time of major movement towards democratic governance throughout the world. In Central and Eastern Europe that movement has been reflected in dramatic transitions that have been widely watched and analyzed. In other countries of the world, even those that are traditionally cited as highly developed democratic systems, much change also has been occurring.

One of the main areas of democratic development in the region is reflected in the emergence and strengthening of local governance. In Central and Eastern Europe, a new generation of elected municipal leadership has emerged. Likewise, in countries with long histories of democratic development, such as those
in Western Europe and North America, local governments have been given more responsibilities and are seen as increasingly important actors in the process of democratic institution building. This is true in countries as diverse as Canada, Chile, France and Sweden. A key participant in this process of democratic development has been the local mayor. Increasingly, both countries making dramatic transitions to democracy, and those who are continuing long processes of democratic development, are witnessing the emergence of more dynamic, responsive and influential local leadership. In many instances, the person who embodies this development is, in fact, the local mayor.

This development can be seen in Ukraine, a country engaged in a complex and sometimes difficult transition to democracy. In this article, mayoral leadership and Ukrainian political-administrative relationships will be examined comparatively in two cities, Kyiv and Odessa. The two cities represent the two most significant cases of local governance development in that country during the past decade. Kyiv is not only the capital city of Ukraine, but represents the country’s most important and dynamic local economy. Odessa, on the other hand, arguably is the country’s most progressive local government. Odessa is the first city in the Ukraine to privatize its water system and has been a leader in establishing neighborhood based structures to mobilize citizen participation. In both cities the office of mayor (or head of city) and its occupant has been at the center of the most important local developments. As such, a comparative examination of the activities of the mayor in each city will enable us to better understand both the role of the mayor and the resources upon which they must rely in order to bring about significant local development.

The Office of Mayor: Roles and Resources

A recent study of top level local government officials in 14 western countries (both elected mayors and appointed chief executive officers) by Poul Erick Mouritzen and James Svara, has suggested that there are four major roles played by the leader of local governments. These are serving as: public leader, policy leader, partisan leader, and proactive leader. As public leader, the mayor represents the community to the public and serves as the promoter of the community’s interest and wellbeing. As policy leader, the mayor initiates new directions in public policy and, as proactive leader, the mayor is responsible for setting a broader agenda for the future wellbeing of his or her community. The mayor, as partisan leader, serves as the leader of his or her local political party.

To carry out these various tasks effectively, the mayor needs to mobilize all of the resources available to him or her. For the most part, these resources fall into two major categories – formal and informal. Formal resources involve those mayoral powers that are specifically identified in municipal, provincial, or national legislation. Typically, they involve the formal authority of the mayor as head of the municipal government. They include such resources as the authority to appoint and dismiss top level administrators (and in some increasingly rare cases, virtually all municipal employees); significant authority in the development of the municipal budget and in proposals for the raising of local revenue; a major role in establishing service delivery agency policy directions and significant authority vis-à-vis the municipal council. While the mayor’s formal resources may vary greatly from country to country and province to province, they are for the most part, a precondition of mayoral leadership that the office provides to its incumbents by endowing them with important governmental authority.

The other major area of resources available to municipal chief executives is what may be characterized as informal, or more personal, resources. In many instances, the most important such resource is the role of the municipal chief executive vis-à-vis his or her local political party. The municipal chief executive who is also the leader of the dominant local political party is more unlikely to have a high degree of support from the local municipal council and/or other policy-making bodies. In addition, the capacity of the local chief executive to lead his or her community is often affected by a host of other highly personal factors. Among these are the mayor’s knowledge and experience (both in municipal
affairs and politics); various individual attributes (reputation for integrity, speaking ability, familiar public image, etc.); personal resource mobilization capacity (individual or family wealth, capacity for mobilizing organizational and/or individual support, etc.); and level of energy, available time and degree of personal commitment.

**Basic Structure of Local Self-government in Ukraine**

Local government in Europe, and other Western democracies, is regarded as representative and responsive of citizen interests. Similarly, local government is one of the most important elements in Ukraine's system of public administration. The Ukrainian Constitution adopted on June 28, 1996 established several important principles of local self-governance in Ukraine and defined approaches to its power. The Constitution of Ukraine recognizes that local government represents the right of a territorial community (the inhabitants of a village, town, or city) to make decisions on local issues independently. This right can be exercised either directly, for example, through referendum, or indirectly, through local government bodies such as councils and their executive boards.

The local self-government structure in Ukraine consists of the local council, the Mayor, the executive committee, the municipal secretary and various local government departments. According to the law of Ukraine “On Local Self-Government”, the local council can act on about 50 functions involving a rather wide circle of activities. The local council enacts municipal legislation and establishes standing committees, composed of council deputies, that monitor issues related to specific areas of activity. The mayor, who is elected for a four-year-term on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot, leads the executive body of the council, presides at its meetings, calls council sessions, determines the agenda, chairs the sessions, signs the council's decisions into law and is the only person who can represent the council in its relations with other legal entities.

The executive committee – which is chaired and appointed by the Mayor with the approval of the local council - collectively makes executive decisions and consists of experts in city management. It cannot, however, include members of the municipal council. The municipal secretary, who often acts as a deputy mayor, is nominated by the mayor and elected by the council. The departments of the city administration usually include separate units for the various areas of local concern -- e.g. budgeting, economic development, municipal property management, housing services, public transportation, construction, education, health care, culture, sport, regulation of land relations, ecology and social protection.

The city mayor, as the highest person of local self-government, is given responsibility by city residents to exercise both representative and executive authority, and to oversee and control the administrative functions of local self-government. The mayor, executing these functions, signs the executive committee's decisions, and is authorized to represent the executive committee in its relations with other organizations. The mayor also has the authority to hire and fire the department heads. These functions testify that the position of the city mayor is the most important position in the system of local self-government.

The mayor manages the budget, represents the city in relations with various bodies of state (national) power, other bodies of local self-government, provides everyday management of local affairs and insures the execution of City Council decisions. The financial basis for the execution of administrative functions relies upon various sources of funding including public property; local revenues; other funds; land or natural resources owned by territorial communities, cities and city districts; and also common property that is managed by district and oblast councils.

On the whole, there are more than twenty mayoral functions identified in the Law of Ukraine “On Local Self-Government” Though all functions and responsibilities noted above are inherent responsibilities for any mayor, the success of their implementation and/or realization in each specific
In Ukraine, there are two different types of urban affairs management: the system of local self-government, which exists separate from the national administration, and the system which is characterized by the merging in a single community of the bodies of local self-government and the national, or state, power at the local level. Within the first system, the bodies of local self-government execute only the predefined competencies of local government and any responsibilities of public power specifically delegated to them by national ministries or oblast administrations.

Within the second type, at the level of cities, local officials form both the bodies of local self-government and the agencies of national or state power. In such cities, the Mayor, elected by the population and simultaneously appointed by the President of Ukraine to be the head of the local state administration. Thus, the bodies of local self-government and the executive bodies of state power co-exist in the municipal government on the basis of mutual delegation of responsibilities. The second system exists only in two important national cities – the capital city of Kyiv and the Crimean capital of Sebastopol.

Particular aspects of the exercise of local self-government in the Cities of Kyiv and Sebastopol are determined by special laws of Ukraine. Among the special laws in the sphere of local self-government is the law “On Capital of Ukraine – City-Hero Kyiv”. It was adopted on January 15, 1999 by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, was signed by the President and was published in February 1999. This law provides that the Kyiv community elects the Kyiv City mayor, deputies of the city council and also deputies of city district councils. This arrangement means that the Mayor of Kiev and the Mayor of Odessa have, quite different degrees of power and authority.

**The Mayor in Kyiv**

Kyiv is a city that has undergone dramatic changes during the last decade. Ten years ago it was a city that was very dark at night, had virtually no luxury goods, and at times looked rather grim. Today, it is a city of bright lights, many lovely shops, and pleasant restaurants and outdoor cafes. Not all have benefited equally from the changes, however, and that is one of the perennial issues of concern. Some have become very wealthy, many are getting along, and some have been left very far behind. A major player in bringing about the transformation of Kyiv has been the city’s mayor, during most of this period, Oleksander Omelchenko.

Prior to the 1999 election, Kyiv’s then mayor, Leonid Kosakivsky, led a city council that was divided almost equally between two political parties, the Communists and Rukh, a somewhat conservative, free-market oriented party. This situation, a city council almost equally divided between left and right, created a serious division of political power. Not only was the city council unable to make rapid decisions, but it frequently was acting in opposition to the mayor.

In addition, to his problems with the city council, Kosakivsky was often in conflict with, and perceived to be highly disliked by then Ukrainian President, Leonid Kuchma. This was of particular significance since, as noted above, the mayor of Kyiv has significant authority and responsibilities that derive from the national government. In addition, in a highly centralized country with an historically encompassing national government, the President of Ukraine would inevitably have major influence within the capital city. In part, because of the political power stalemate in the city council, and the apparent lack of support from President Kuchma, Kosakivsky was perceived as a not very effective leader. The result of this was that Kosakivsky was frequently characterized as someone who, though he spoke beautifully, was afraid of everything and did nothing.
As a result of his political problems, Kosakivsky was strongly challenged in the 1998 election, and ultimately lost the mayoral election to O.Omelchenko, who received 72% of the vote. Unlike Kosakivsky, Omelchenko had been able to put together a broad coalition of political support. In the election campaign, a wide range of political parties (from “the left wing” to “the right wing”), numerous non-governmental organizations (including the “Afghanistan War Soldiers”), and leaders of many small and medium-sized businesses supported him. In total, the Omelchenko team formed an electoral coalition, “Our Mayor is O.Omelchenko”, which included 42 non-governmental organizations, 25 political parties, 18 women’s groups, 11 youth groups, 4 religious groups, and many deputies of the city council.

Omelchenko’s ability to put together such a wide-ranging coalition of support served him well in two regards. First, it created an impressive base of campaign support – far greater than that of any of his rivals. Second, it also suggested that he was a strong leader. As a result of this success, Omelchenko was able to receive significant voting support from all elements of Kyiv’s population, including the wealthy, the middle class and the poor.

One result of Omelchenko’s convincing victory in the 1998 elections was the bringing to the Kyiv city council many of his closest allies. In fact, following the 1998 election, the largest party grouping in the council was the 35 deputies from the “Yednist” (“Unity”) political party, which was headed by Omelchenko. As a result, Omelchenko was in a position to consolidate his authority, with all of his chief deputies and the heads of the mayor city agencies all belonging to his political party grouping.

Not only did Omelchenko develop a strong majority in the city council, but in addition, he began to rapidly build alliances with powerful authorities in the national government. He also made major efforts to interact on a routine basis with various citizen groups and individual citizens, while at the same time cultivating relationships with the city’s most economically powerful citizens.

While local self-government needs support from the bottom, in Kyiv support from the top authorities of the state is no less important. In general, Omelchenko was able to receive such support, although he was not without his critics. More than a few national and local leaders suggested that Omelchenko was too arrogant, too independent, and too non-controlled for the typical Ukrainian leader. In fact, many suggested that Omelchenko created “a kingdom within a kingdom” – in essence, his own autonomous subsystem under the strict and semi-authoritarian regime of President Kuchma. In fact, his relationships with Kuchma varied greatly from time to time, but in general, they were quite positive.

Subsequently, when Viktor Yushchenko came to power on the strength of the “Orange Revolution”, he also developed strong relationships with Omelchenko (who had supported the Orange Revolution). However, as with Yushchenko’s predecessor Kuchma, there were instances of conflict. Often those have involved not direct criticism of Omelchenko, but rather criticism of his staff. However, both Yushchenko and Omelchenko realized that they needed to work together.

Under both presidents, Omelchenko remained a highly visible figure, perceived to be a strong leader. In that regard, Omelchenko was able to put together team of talented specialists who worked harmoniously with him (in part because of a fear that opposition would lead to dismissal) to develop his program of activities. As mayor, Omelchenko engaged in a wide array of activities. He supported and facilitated many efforts at new development within Kyiv. This included a major rebuilding of the central downtown square, Independence Square (Maidan Nezalezhnosti), complete with a beautiful underground shopping center and a variety of above ground columns and monuments. In particular, he put great influence on what was characterized as “the philosophy of concrete deeds”.

As mayor, Omelchenko took great pride in being identified as the city’s “builder, chief economist and housekeeper”. He was constantly organizing new coalitions from the various political parties and groups of city council deputies. He built not only houses and underground stores, but he also
continued to build quite successfully, the foundation of his own political power. He routinely lobbied for local and national laws which strengthened the advantages of Kyiv’s mayor’s power over the state administration power of the national government. He also was skillful in overseeing and maximizing the city’s financial situation. In doing so, he built the system of financial flows in such a way that decisions orders and permissions regarding municipal finances went through him and, thus, he had direct control over the larger part of municipal budget including funds granted through the state administration.

Not surprisingly, within a few years of assuming Mayorship, Omelchenko had developed the image and reputation of being the “boss” of the city. He was seen as a highly successful political leader who was particularly concerned with the physical rebuilding of the city, including the development of new highways, parking garages and hotels. He was also seen as something of a showman, as a result of both his authoritative and dynamic style, and his inclination to organize concerts in the city square that he had so energetically rebuilt. However, he was not without his critics, including many of the local non-governmental organizations who claimed he had little concern about the traditional buildings and landscape of Kyiv.

Particularly important in terms of Omelchenko’s ability to succeed as mayor, was the fact that Kyiv’s economy began to develop very strongly under his leadership of the city. Between 2002-2003, annual industrial productivity within Kyiv grew by 14% - far and away, the largest such increase since the proclaiming of Ukraine’s independence. In addition, as the city was physically rehabilitated, tourism began to develop. This, in turn, encouraged significant investment in the city’s economy. According to data produced by the city’s statistical agency, investment in the first half of 2004 exceeded that of the entirety of 2003, with the key investing countries being the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Austria, Switzerland and Cyprus. In addition, many of the city’s strategic enterprises remained as property of the municipality. This ensured the employment of many thousands of Kyiv residents, and certainly encouraged their loyalty to the municipal leadership. All of this resulted in a situation in which the municipal budget was generally in quite good shape throughout Omelchenko’s tenure as mayor.

Many factors contributed to Omelchenko’s success. He is quick to borrow ideas from other major municipalities. While giving the impression of being a strong leader, he didn’t hesitate to seek political compromises when necessary. He made sure to maintain good political relationships with both the national government and key local figures. In addition to his talent as a leader, he has a good understanding of the financial implications of the job. Finally, he was very successful in creating significant political coalitions.

**The Mayor in Odessa**

Odessa is arguably Ukraine’s second most cosmopolitan city. While a relatively young city (approximately 200 years old), it nevertheless has a very strong cultural and literary tradition. It also has an exceptionally strong commercial base, in part, due to its role as the country’s most significant commercial seaport. Further contributing to its overall economic wellbeing is the fact that, dating back to the nineteen century, the city has historically been one of the region’s most important tourist destinations for the political elite.

The city has also been a site of ongoing political conflict within and around the office of mayor. The conflict has manifested itself in two different but related ways. First, there has been the ongoing rivalry between two strong-willed, but very different individuals. Second, there has been the ongoing conflict between levels of government. In fact, the contradictions between the Law of Ukraine “On Local Self-Government” and the legislation on state administrations (oblast and local bodies of executive power – raions) has constantly created conflicts of responsibilities between these two
levels of governmental power. In the mid 90’s such conflict existed in a major way in Odessa. This was reflected in a history of considerable and intense political conflict between the Odessa City government (headed by Ruslan Bodelan). In many respects, these conflicts – especially between Gurvits and Bodelan – reflected the conflicts between the old Communist Ukraine and the emerging democratic Ukraine.

Gurvits, who was Odessa mayor from 1994 - 1998, was a person who had never occupied party posts, a businessman of the first generation, a representative of the more democratic, free market parts of Ukrainian society. Gurvits and Bodelan belonged to two different political and economic worlds (e.g. in the landmark 2004 President’s elections they supported different candidates: Bodelan being the head of the regional office of the Party of Regions supported outgoing President Kuchma’s candidate, Viktor Yanukovich; while Gurvits supported the Orange Revolution opposition, Viktor Yushchenko).

In the mid 1990's, Bodelan, as the representative of the President, served as the head of oblast administration. Prior to that, he had experience in Komsomol League and Communist Party activity. His career was that of a typical party bureaucratic apparatus worker. He worked in numerous administrative structures including Secretary of the Communist Party district committee, of its oblast committee, of its oblast committee, as an administrator of various Komsomol organs; instructor at the Central Committee of the Lenin Young Communists League of Ukraine; and first secretary of district committee and the oblast committee. Through these positions, he had developed considerable administrative experience and managerial skill. Sometimes as a party administrator he fell back on the “old traditions”, but at other times, he did try to adapt methods of old-command-administrative system to modern conditions. At those times, he did try to engage in the art of compromise and could behave in a diplomatic fashion.

Bodelan’s career did have some difficult periods. He was dismissed from his position as head of the Odessa oblast state administration, as a result of political conflict with the President of the country. In order to rebuild his political power base, he and various of his supporters created an important non-governmental organization (NGO) that came to be known as “Renaissance of the Region”. It was funded on the basis of membership fees paid by industrial organizations, trade unions and other important supporting organizations. The NGO focused on activities designed to enhance Bodelan’s image with the public. In order to do so, it engaged in some very basic activities, such as making food available to low income individuals at relatively cheap prices, and organizing other kinds of activities to develop popular support.

As Mayor prior to 1998, Gurvits and his team had much success in their activity. Odessa had developed even more status as a prominent resort city; it had obtained a good credit rating; and much investment was attracted to the city which facilitated development of an international airport and the building of the techno-park. However, between 1994 - 1998, major social-political city conflict characterized the city government in Odessa tension between the oblast administration and the city administration split the local community.

The 1998 election put an end to the political contradiction between oblast and municipality in Odessa. The election campaign resulted in unprecedented nastiness, insinuations and campaign offences. Gurvits drew into his election campaign the city’s commercial structures and formed his own special election ideology, “everything is devoted to one goal – to win”.

On the strength great efforts, Bodelan came to power as Odessa Mayor in the 1998 elections. In his election campaign, Bodelan said “the city is becoming a discredit, the housing fund is dying, the electric transport is ruined… Odessa is being destroyed. I want to help my city. I am going to live here”. However, Gurvits claimed that the election had been manipulated on behalf of Bodelan and that the political contradiction remained due to the fact that during the four years of his mayorship
he had the un-doubted support of the Odessa residents, but that Bodelan had come to the office without that support.

Speaking about himself as a Mayor, Bodelan had commented: “I am stable in my position. It is not a passive position, but an active one, with the President’s support (Kuchma), on reforming the political system, the administrative-territorial system of Ukraine” Bodelan went on to suggest that “a bad law is better than no law” and as such he required the municipality be guided by national law and its requirements, and demanded from his subordinates a respect of the public norms. Initially, the acts in Bodelan’s City Council were adopted in a rather quiet manner in the sense that there was very little political conflict within the Council or between it, the Mayor or the state (oblast and national) administration. As mass media in Odessa described, it was because the overwhelming majority of deputies was formed to serve one person – the Mayor – and among the deputies there were very few people ready to be in opposition to city authorities. The absence of serious debate was perceived by the media to be a very negative fact regarding the character and quality of decisions made.

After new elections in March, 2002 Bodelan was re-elected the mayor of Odessa (though, according to exit-poll data, his rival Gurvits, had won the election attracting two to three times more votes than Bodelan). Gurvits, who ran for Odessa mayor as a candidate from the “Our Ukraine” coalition, claimed that there were many electoral violations on the day of elections and during the vote counting, and that they had been videotaped and registered by observers. Consequently, Gurvits brought suit and the results of the election went into the courts and on May 21, 2002 the Odessa Zhovtnevy District Court turned down the lawsuit of E. Gurvits against Odessa Mayor R. Bodelan. The court declared the decision of the Odessa City Election Committee to register Bodelan as Odessa Mayor and the results of mayoral election to be legitimate. In line with the decisions of the Odessa City Election Committee, Bodelan was re-registered Odessa mayor.

However, as a result of opposition to Bodelan in the mass media there was created a critical attitude on the part of some Odessa citizens to City Council decisions. The opposition to the Mayor also was formed by and consisted of Gurvits supporters. After the creation of the “Nasha Ukraina (Our Ukraine)” block led by Gurvits, the opposition to Bodelan “poured” smoothly into it. This opposition was always interested in Bodelan’s resignation or retirement – believing fervently that he had stolen the 1992 election.

One of the main successes of Bodelan’s mayorship was seen in the growth of the international role of Odessa. While Odessa remained the southern gate of Ukraine, the years of independence had given rise to the development of new transit routes. However, Odessa kept pace through the integration of its transport complex into the system of international transport corridors. To facilitate this, the Odessa airport was re-constructed, new capacities were created for the Odessa seaport and a new autobahn from Odessa to Kyiv was begun.

Within the city itself, the electric municipal transport was renewed (Bodelan had spoken about the need to buy new trams and trolleybuses during the campaign). The quality of the drinking water was improved and water supply was provided during both day and night (although much remains to be done in terms of an adequate water supply). Towards this end, the water system was privatized. Work was done to improve the beaches (private capital was attracted); and many communal apartments were sold to private owners.

A key element of the Bodelan administration was the degree of cooperation between levels of government – city and oblast and national governments. In contrast to Gurvits, Bodelan had very strong ties to the political establishment in Kyiv and in Ukraine as a whole. He respected to power of the President and looked to the Verhovna Rada (the parliament) and the President to help solve local economic and social problems.
Bodelan argued that solving the problems of the city is possible only by working together and there were lots of such examples e.g. building of streets/roads in Odessa was provided with support of oblast budget; the re-construction of Odessa Opera House- with the support of the President and the national government. Good relations with powerful people characterized Bodelan’s personality, and as such, facilitated his successful activity. This contrasted dramatically with Gurvits, the previous mayor, who could not work well with the central authorities. Whereas Bodelan was an ally of President Kuchma, Gurvits felt the President was to be a primitive person who was not careful and behaved in a risky manner. This non-respectful attitude to the head of state created great indignation among the President’s supporters.

For three years (2002-2005), the opposition was confident that the data they had was enough to get the Mayor dismissed. As the 2004 presidential elections approached, the conflict between Bodelan and Gurvits reemerged. It was widely suggested that, “if you are against Bodelan – vote for Yushchenko. Yanukovich tomorrow means Bodelan forever”. City authorities, aiming to survive, worked hard for Yanukovich. Bodelan headed the city organization of “The Party of Regions” (where Yanukovich was a leader) and, as a result, in Odessa you could see only Yanukovich billboards saying “Odessa supports Yanukovich”.

In March 2005, after President’s elections and V.Yushchenko (leader of “Our Ukraine”) victory, People’s Deputy and once Odessa mayor Gurvits filed a complaint with the Odessa Primorsky District Court to challenge the returns of the March 31, 2002 Odessa mayor elections. On April 4, 2005 the Odessa Primorsky District Court completed hearing the Gurvits vs City electoral commission case and ruled to invalidate the electoral commission’s resolution # 201 of April 3, 2002, which declared Ruslan Bodelan as having won the mayor elections. The Court ruled to oblige the electoral commission to register Eduard Gurvits as the Odessa mayor. Consequently, Gurvits became the second person in Ukraine (along with the President of the country) who had won his fight over fair elections in the court. The new mayor has initiated and is realizing the process of re-privatization of municipal property.

**Reconsidering the Role of the Mayor**

By having examined the role of the mayor in both Ukrainian cities, we have been able to obtain a comprehensive picture of the many activities in which a successful mayor t routinely engage. We also have obtained a better sense of the many responsibilities required of the holder of the office by looking at the mayor as both as administrative and political leader. In fact, when one combines the political and policy responsibilities of top level local officials with their administrative responsibilities, one can identify several significant roles performed by local leaders in Ukraine's mayor cities.. Among these, are:

1. **Exemplar of the Public Image of the Local Community:** While often the realities of performance may fall short, certainly many local citizens see their chief local government official as representing that which is best about their community in terms of a variety of values ranging from personal integrity to entrepreneurial achievement.

2. **Creator of Political Coalitions:** In most local communities, and especially larger ones, the issues addressed by local governments are complex enough to involve many different political and economic interests. The mayor is individual most often expected to negotiate among those various interests in order to achieve the consensus necessary to move forward on major issues of community concern.

3. **Initiator of Policy Proposals:** While many proposals for new policies emerge out of either the agencies of the local government or from various interest groups, in most instances it is the mayor who commands the necessary attention to really bring new ideas onto the local political agenda. Consequently, the local chief executive is expected to be the principal advocate of policy reform and innovation.
4. **Developer of Long-term Vision for the Community:** While one of the major responsibilities of the local chief executive is to deal with immediate policy concerns, increasingly, it is expected that this will be done within the context of the development of a long-term vision of where the community should be moving. The development of such a vision, while the responsibility of the mayor, must also integrate the interests of the diverse elements that are found in many local communities.

5. **Representative of the Community to Other Levels of Government:** In many instances, municipal affairs are highly impacted by other levels of government (state, provincial, national, etc.). It is increasingly expected that the local chief executive will take the lead role in addressing those issues that involve other levels of government.

6. **Responder to Constituent Needs:** As municipal governments have become more important, and as they have increased the array of services which they deliver to local communities, the role of the municipal chief executive in being the person to whom local citizens look when they have a problem has grown significantly.

7. **Promotor of the Local Community:** With the emergence of stronger local government, it is increasingly expected that the local mayor will serve as the chief publicist of the virtues of the community that he or she represents. This can range from promoting tourism to persuading private entrepreneurs that the mayor’s city represents the best prospect for successful business activity.

**Conclusion**

The effective Ukrainian mayor must possess the ability to unite the territorial community, to create coalitions to achieve mutual goals, to regulate internal and external relations, to defend municipal interests as regards to other territorial units and the state, to gain support through political parties, and to influence the formation of general values. Unfortunately these political functions are not clearly defined in current legislation. That means that sometimes the mayor does not have adequate resources to guarantee the success of her/his activity. Also, there are times when mayors who have been elected by city population are dismissed, through political machinations, from their positions without the citizens’ agreement. Sometimes this can be for incompetence, but often it is for highly political reasons.

Nevertheless, there can be no question of the importance of the Mayor in terms of the building of the local community. In both Kyiv and Odessa, aggressive and energetic mayors played mayor roles in moving those cities forward in very significant ways. They did this by drawing upon all of both the informal and the formal resources which are typically available to mayors. Equally as important, they assumed at one time or another all of the various roles that mayors can assume, and which has been described above. Most notably in this regard, they work diligently at initiating significant political coalitions and developing important relationships with other levels of government – especially high level national government officials.

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